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Abstract 
IEEE 802.11 is the standard designed to provide secured communication in wireless LAN. IEEE 802.11w 
authentication protocol enhances the IEEE802.11i security for selected management frames. These protocols 
allow a wireless station to gain access to a protected wireless network managed by an access point. In this 
paper, a section of the protocol is chosen for modelling and verification. Communicating Sequential Process 
(CSP) is used for modelling and the verification is performed using CasperFDR. CasperFDR can verify most of 
the communication protocols. It can perform an exhaustive verification that can establish with mathematical 
certainty whether or not a given behaviour is error-free. CasperFDR is used to specify system behaviour in a 
formal validation model that defines interactions between the processes. This paper models IEEE802.11w 
authentication protocol by formal verification using CasperFDR and analyzes the output. A few attacks are 
found in this protocol. The specifications through which these attacks were found are presented. 
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1. Introduction 
Formal verification is the process of examining the protocol specifications for the presence of various errors 
that could lead to improper operation.  Formal methods have been widely used to specify security protocols and 
verify security properties, such as confidentiality, authentication and non repudiation, to guarantee correctness 
[1] [2] [3]. 
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     Formal verification is better than testing by implementation because it performs exhaustive testing before 
implementation and it is fully automated. 
Failure Divergence Refinement (FDR) [4] is one type of formal verification tool for state machine, with 
foundations in the theory of concurrency based on Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). This tool 
checks whether a security model described with CSP [5] [6] satisfies security properties such as secrecy and 
tisfy these properties, FDR shows counterexample and helps to 
identify which attack is possible. In creating the description of the security model with CSP is a very error-
prone and difficult task. To simplify the expression of the security protocol in CSP Gavin Lowe developed 
CasperFDR [7] [8]. 
CasperFDR is another formal verification tool used to verify communication protocols. It enables a non 
the notation used by CSP, using various key types, messages, security properties and intruder knowledge 
descriptions contained in CasperFDR. In brief, CasperFDR is a compiler that translates a more simple and 
concise description of a security communication model into CSP code. The security process is described by 
 
It either performs random simulations of a protocol's execution or generates a CSP program that performs an 
language called SPL (protocol specification language). Using this language, system behaviour can be specified 
in a formal validation model that defines interactions of processes. CasperFDR can perform an exhaustive 
verification that can establish with mathematical certainty whether or not a given behaviour is error-free. 
Especially, the use of CaperFDR approach has been very successful over the past few years and has discovered 
many attacks against protocols [9].  
WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) protocol is a subset of IEEE 802.11i standard. The IEEE 802.11i standard is 
designed to provide secured communication of wireless LAN as defined by all the IEEE 802.11 specifications. 
IEEE 802.11i enhances the WEP (Wire line Equivalent Privacy), a technology used for many years for the 
WLAN security, in the areas of encryption, authentication and key management. IEEE 802.11i is based on the 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), which is a quick fix of the WEP weaknesses [10].  
The IEEE 802.11i standard provides secure communication between Authenticator and supplicant by using 
authentication, encryption and data integrity. The core is 802.1x (Port Access Control) and TKIP (Temporal 
Key Integrity Protocol). The IEEE 802.1X offers an effective framework for authenticating and controlling user 
traffic to a protected network, as well as dynamically varying encryption keys. 802.1X ties a protocol called 
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) to both the wired and wireless LAN media and supports multiple 
authentication methods, such as token cards, Kerberos, one-time passwords, certificates, and public key 
authentication. WPA protocol is a subset of IEEE 802.11i standard. 
For verification of security protocols in wireless networks, it is important to identify the capabilities of an 
adversary. There are three types of frames in WLAN they are Management Frames, Control Frames, and Data 
Frames. Any modification to these frames directly impacts data confidentiality, integrity, mutual 
authentication, and availability. Such a modification is called as a threat. The IEEE 802.11i enhances the 
security of IEEE 802.11 at MAC layer by using two protocols, WPA-PSK and WPA-GPG for authentication of 
wireless station to access point. In IEEE 802.11i the system management information is represented in 
unencrypted management frames, which makes them vulnerable. The IEEE 802.11w enhances the security of 
IEEE 802.11i by providing data confidentiality to management frames which provides data integrity, data 
origin authentication and replay protection. 
First, we formally model and analyze the IEEE 802.11w protocol with CasperFDR. Next, we use 
CasperFDR to show that there are no other known attacks on IEEE 802.11w protocols. The main aim of this 
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paper is to model and verify some of the important portions of IEEE802.11w authentication protocol.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
Johnson and Walker are among the first researchers who discussed the security issues in IEEE 802.16 [11]. 
They propose to enhance PKMv1 protocols with mutual authentication to enable the SS to authenticate the BS 
as well as the BS authenticating the SS, and w
Chin-Tser Huang, Manton M. Matthews [12], have analyzed security issues on the PKMv1, PKMv2 protocols 
using Casper FDR and proposed solutions.  
Later formal verification of PKMv3 protocol in IEEE 802.16m using CasperFDR was done in [13] and 
several issues in the protocol were highlighted. IEEE 802.16 is the standard for specifying the air interface of 
Wireless Metropolitan Area Network (Wireless MAN).  The IEEE 802.16m standard specifies a security sub 
layer at the bottom of the MAC layer, to provide initial key agreement between Mobile Stations (MS) and Base 
Station (BS) and key information transfer between Base Station (BS) and Relay Station (RS) during multi hop 
relay. There are two protocols in the security sub layer: an Encapsulation protocol and Privacy Key 
Management protocol. The Encapsulation protocol is used for encrypting packet data. The Privacy and Key 
Management protocol is used for secure distribution of keying information from the BS to the RS. In a frame 
work for agreement in multi hop relay for broad band wireless access is the new feature provided in PKMv3. 
Formal verification techniques to [14] ASK mobile security protocol using CasperFDR was proposed and 
identified the possibility of replay attack. The functionality of this protocol is to provide authentication and key 
agreement in low-power portable devices such as mobile phones.  
A Formal verification of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [15] was done and the problem of 
assigning the same IP addresses to different hosts was identified. DHCP is a widely used communication 
protocol. To connect the Internet, a host requires an IP address, a subnet mask and the address of a nearby 
router. These elements must be reconfigured when a host moves or relocates to a new place. DHCP provides a 
framework for passing these configuration parameters to a fixed or mobile host connecting to a TCP/IP 
network. A portion of the protocol is chosen for modeling and verification, namely the assignment of new IP 
address to a newly arriving host [15]. 
In [16] formal verification technique was applied to check the correctness of Intrusion tolerant group 
membership protocol using SPIN model checker. The authors also describes about the modelling aspects of the 
protocol using SPIN. The authors also describe how they handled state space explosion problem by considering 
proper abstraction level of protocol [16].  
A formal verification of WPA-PSK Authentication Protocol in IEEE 802.11i was done using CasperFDR 
[17] and identified some of the attacks that are possible in that protocol.  WPA-PSK is a four-way handshake 
aiming to verify that STA knows the secret Pre-Shared Key, also known as Pair wise Master Key (PMK), and 
to establish a Pair wise Transient Key (PTK) which is installed into the MAC layer. The goal of WPA-PSK 
four-way handshake protocol is to create a PTK known both to supplicant and authenticator while not revealing 
the PMK. In WPA-PSK the PMK is randomly generated by the STA, encrypted and sent to the authenticating 
AP. Both AP and STA will therefore be able to derive a PTK from the PMK. 
A formal verification of WPA-GPG Authentication Protocol in IEEE 802.11i was done using CasperFDR 
[18] and some of the attacks that are possible in that protocol were identified. The IEEE802.11i specification 
contains WPA-GPG authentication protocol. It allows a wireless station to gain access to a protected wireless 
network managed by access point. WPA-GPG verifies that the authenticating STA is the owner of the key that 
it is providing to the AP.  
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3. The Proposed Model 
 
The objective of modelling a protocol is to study its structure and to verify its completeness and logical 
consistency. In modelling, simplifications are also needed for a description at an abstract level to avoid 
implementation details.  In the following sections, the details of the proposed models are described. 
 
3. 1. IEEE 802.11w Authentication protocol structure 
 
The goal of IEEE 802.11w is to enhance the IEEE802.11 MAC layer security for selected management 
frames. IEEE 802.11w authentication protocol format is defined within the EAP. The EAP reduces IEEE 
802.11w to a four-way handshake aiming to verify that the supplicant (STA) knows the secret Pre-Shared Key, 
also known as Pair wise Master Key (PMK). After that it establishes a Pair wise Transient Key (PTK) which is 
installed into the MAC layer. Besides PTK a Group Transient Key (GTK) is generated to allow the 
transmission of multicast and broadcast traffic within the wireless network.  Integrity Group Transient Key 
(IGTK) is generated to allow the management frames protection. After successful 4-Way Handshake, a secure 
communication channel between the authenticator and the supplicant can be constructed for subsequent data 
transmissions, based on the shared PTK and/or GTK. If Management Frame Protection is negotiated, the IGTK 
and IGTK packet number are sent from the Authenticator to the Supplicant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1. IEEE802.11w Authentication protocol structure [19]. 
 
The first message is sent by the authenticator (AP) and contains the AP random nonce (ANonce). The 
second message is sent by the STA to AP it contains STA random nonce (SNonce) and message integrity code 
of ANonce.  After receiving second message AP is able to derive PTK, check MIC correctness and continue the 
authentication by sending both GTK, IGTK encrypted with PTK and MIC of SNonce in message 3. The fourth 
message is a sort of acknowledgment sent by STA to AP, it contains only MIC of GTK and IGTK. 
 
3. 2. Modelling IEEE 802.11w Authentication Protocol in CasperFDR 
 
The modelled IEEE 802.11w authentication protocol in CasperFDR is shown in Fig.2. In the specification 
the initiator A and responder S represent Authenticator and Supplicant respectively. The following 
specification in Fig.2 intruder knows the information about the public keys of communicating parties. 
 
 
Message1     AP    STA : ANonce 
Message2     STA  AP   : SNonce, MIC(ANonce) 
Message3     AP    STA : {GTK, IGTK}{PTK}, MIC{SNonce} 
Message4     STA  AP   :  MIC{GTK, IGTK} 
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Fig. 2. Specification model for  IEEE802.11w Authentication Protocol. 
 
4. Analysis of IEEE 802.11w authentication protocol 
 
Attacks were found for two of the four properties declared in specification part in Figure 2.  Property1 and 
property2 are related to secret specifications. Property3 and property4 are related to authentication 
specifications. No attacks were found for secret specifications but CasperFDR tool found two attacks on 
authentication specifications in the specification part. The top level trace generated by CasperFDR is that the 
supplicant believes it has completed a run of the protocol with authenticator. But at the same time authenticator 
believes that it is still running the protocol with supplicant. An attack on the property3 Agreement(A, S, 
[na,ns]) as shown in Fig.3 can be explained in the following steps. 
#Free variables 
A, S : Agent 
na, ns : Nonce 
kpm, kpt, kgt, kigt : SessionKey 
pk : Agent  PublicKey 
sk : Agent  SecretKey 
f : HashFunction 
InverseKeys=(pk, sk),(kpm, kpm),(kpt, kpt),(kgt, kgt),(kigt, kigt) 
#Processes 
INITIATOR(A,na,kpt,kpm,kgt,kigt) knows pk, sk(A) 
RESPONDER(S,ns,kpt,kpm,kgt,kigt) knows pk, sk(S) 
#Protocol description 
0.    A : S 
[A != S] 
1. A S : {na}{pk(S)}  
2. S A : {ns}{pk(A)}, f(na) 
3. A S : {kgt, kigt}{kpt}, f(ns) 
4. S A : f(kgt, kigt) 
#Specification 
Secret(A, na, [S]) 
Secret(S, ns, [A]) 
Agreement(A, S, [na,ns]) 
Agreement(S, A, [na,ns]) 
#Actual variables 
Authenticator, Supplicant, Mallory : Agent 
Na, Ns, Nm : Nonce 
Kpm, Kpt, Kgt, Kigt : SessionKey 
InverseKeys = (Kpm, Kpm), (Kpt, Kpt), (Kgt, Kgt), (Kigt, Kigt) 
#Inline functions 
symbolic pk, sk 
#System 
INITIATOR(Authenticator, Na, Kpt, Kpm, Kgt, Kigt) 
RESPONDER(Supplicant, Ns, Kpt, Kpm, Kgt, Kigt) 
#Intruder Information 
Intruder = Mallory 
IntruderKnowledge={Authenticator, Supplicant, Mallory, Nm, pk, sk(Mallory)} 
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0.                         
1. Authenticator  
1. I_Mallory        
2. Supplicant       
2. I_Supplicant   
3. Authenticator  
3. I_Mallory        
4. Supplicant       
Done 
 
Authenticator     
I_Mallory           
Supplicant          
I_Authenticator 
Authenticator      
I_Mallory            
Supplicant           
I_Authenticator  
 
: Mallory 
: {Na}{pk(Mallory)} 
: {Na}{pk(Supplicant)} 
: {Ns}{pk(Authenticator)}, f(Na) 
: {Ns}{pk(Authenticator)}, f(Na) 
: {Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 
: Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 
: f(Kgt,Kigt) 
 
Fig. 3. Attack generated by CasperFDR for property3 in Figure 2. 
 
 Initially the intruder directly receives information about Na value when the Authenticator sends Na value to 
Supplicant as shown in the above messages zero and first instance of message one. 
 During the second instance of message one the intruder acts as Authenticator and sends Na value to 
Supplicant. 
 During the instances of message two the intruder acts as Authenticator (I_Authenticator) for receiving 
information from Supplicant and sends the same information to the Authenticator. 
 Now the intruder acts as a legitimate Supplicant and Authenticator during the instances of message three. 
 However the communication between Supplicant and Authenticator is also captured by the intruder by using 
man-in-the-middle attack. 
 After receiving the entire information the intruder will be in a position such that it can derive GTK and 
IGTK. 
    The attack on the property4 Agreement(S, A, [na,ns]) can be explained with the message sequence seen in 
Fig. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Attack generated by CasperFDR for property4 in Figure 2. 
 
 Initially the intruder acts as Supplicant (I_Supplicant) and receives information about Na value when the 
Authenticator sends Na value to Supplicant as shown in the above messages zero and first instance of 
message one. 
 During the second instance of message one the intruder directly sends Na value to Supplicant. 
 The intruder also receives Ns value form Supplicant and acts as Supplicant (I_Supplicant) and sends the 
same information to Authenticator during instances of message two. 
 Now the intruder acts as a legitimate Supplicant and receives information about PMK during the instances of 
message three. 
 However the communication between Supplicant and Authenticator is also captured by the intruder by using 
man-in-the-middle attack. 
0.                         
1. Authenticator  
1. I_Mallory        
2. Supplicant       
2. I_Supplicant   
3. Authenticator  
3. I_Mallory        
4. Supplicant       
4. I_Supplicant   
Done 
 
 Authenticator  
 I_Supplicant   
Supplicant       
I_Mallory        
Authenticator  
I_Supplicant    
Supplicant       
I_Mallory        
Authenticator  
 
: Supplicant 
: {Na}{pk(Supplicant)} 
: {Na}{pk(Supplicant)} 
: {Ns}{pk(Mallory)}, f(Na) 
: {Ns}{pk(Authenticator)}, f( Na) 
: {Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 
: {Kgt,Kigt}{Kpt}, f(Ns) 
: f(Kgt,Kigt) 
: f(Kgt,Kigt) 
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 After receiving the entire information the intruder will be in a position such that it can derive GTK and 
IGTK. 
    After performing these operations, not only the Authenticator and the Supplicant but the Intruder can also 
derive GTK and IGTK information from PMK, that is the key used between Authenticator and Supplicant for 
message encryption. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, IEEE 802.11w Authentication protocol is modelled using CasperFDR. Two attacks were 
found in this protocol. The two attacks are results of man in the middle attack. In the first attack the intruder 
directly captures valuable information from wireless environment. During the second attack the intruder 
directly receives from authenticator by pretending as a legitimate supplicant.  The attacks that are interpreted 
by CasperFDR and the message sequence results are reported. Although we have modelled specific features of 
this protocol, this can be easily extended to model and test other features as well. 
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